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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Troy's defenses raised on the same notes 
and transactions sued on by the Bank should have been dismissed 
on summary judgment, pursuant to the four-year statute of 
limitations (78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953 as amended), based upon the 
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., 1953 as amended, 
2. Whether Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same 
notes and transactions sued on by the Bank, should have been 
dismissed on summary judgment based upon the four-year statute of 
limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
3. Whether the dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims, alleged 
to have occurred in November of 1988, well into the four-year 
limitation period, was appropriate on summary judgment based upon 
the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25, U.C.A. 1953 as 
amended• 
4. Whether there were genuine issues of material fact with 
respect to Troy's Counterclaims remaining after the court's 
ruling on the statutes of limitation issues (limited to Counts 
Five and Six as relating to the November 1988 loan) to preclude 
summary judgment being entered on those claims. 
These issues were all ruled on in summary judgment, 
therefore, the standard of review is de novo. The appellate 
court is to apply the same standard as that applied by the trial 
court. Durham v. Marqetts, 571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977). The 
appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the 
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losing party below, (Troy) in determining whether those facts 
require, as a matter of law, the entry of judgment for the 
prevailing party below* The appellate court is to give no 
deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are 
reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 119 
P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The nature of the case and course of proceeding has already 
been set forth by Troy in its opening brief ("Appellant's 
Brief"). Troy however, wishes to emphasize the fact that the 
issues in this case (certainly Troy's Counterclaims and defenses) 
involve the continuing relationship Troy had with the Bank, 
commencing in 1985 and continuing up until the time this law suit 
was filed. 
The Bank in its Memorandum ("Respondent's Brief") has tried 
to separate everything into three distinct time periods. 
However, the actions of the Bank, including its attempts to 
remedy the problems it created in the initial loan, were 
continuous and on-going. It has been admitted by the Bank that 
it did not have the funds for Troy upon SBA approval of the 
initial loan and that the Bank tried to remedy this problem as 
quickly as possible. (See Respondent's Brief, Statement of Facts 
6, 7 & 8). The Bank made the subsequent loans to remedy the 
problems created by the Bank. (See Respondent's Brief, Statement 
of Fact No. 10). 
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Troy contends, and has maintained from the beginning, that 
its financial problems originated from the problems with the 
initial loan. After that time the matter became the Bank's 
problem. The Bank has acknowledged this and has attempted in a 
number of ways to remedy the problems created over a period of 
years, including the 1987 and 1988 loans. These attempts however 
did not remedy the problem. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Troy's defenses raised on the same notes and 
transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed 
on summary judgment pursuant to the four-year statute of 
limitations (78-12-25 U.C.A. 1953 as amended) based upon the 
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
a. A statute of limitation as a general rule is not a bar 
to asserting a claim as a defense. The Troy Defendants are 
entitled to their claims to the extent of the amount claimed by 
the Bank regardless of the statute of limitations period. 
b. The second sentence of 78-12-44 pertains to the effect 
of payment, acknowledgment or promise to pay as addressed in the 
first sentence and the heading of the statute. It was not 
intended to change or circumvent the long-standing rule that 
defenses are not barred by the statute of limitations. 
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2. Troy's Counterclaims arising from the same notes and 
transactions sued on by the Bank should not have been dismissed 
based upon the four-year statute of limitations, 78-12-25 U.C.A* 
1953 as amended. 
a. The Counterclaims are based upon loan transactions for 
which there is a sufficient writing for the six-year limitation 
period to be applied. 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 as amended. 
b. The Counterclaims are based upon transactions and a 
relationship with the Bank which continued through November of 
1988 and thereafter up until the time of the law suit. The 
Bank's actions occurred well within the four-year limitation 
period. 
3. There are genuine issues of material fact relating to 
Troy's claims, not barred by the statute of limitations (limited 
to Counts Five and Six relating to the 1988 loan) but dismissed 
on summary judgment, to preclude the entry of summary judgment. 
a. There are material issues of fact concerning the 
Bank's relationship to the Troy Defendants at the time of the 
1988 loan. 
b. There are material issues of fact regarding the 
Bank's actions with respect to the 1988 loan. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DEFENSES RAISED SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT BASED ON THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The Bank argues in its Brief that the Troy defendants never 
properly asserted its claims as affirmative defenses. This is 
simply not the case and the Bank should be estopped from making 
such an argument at this time. 
The defendants properly raised as defenses the Bank's 
failure to properly release and disburse the loan proceeds in 
breach of the agreed terms (Fifth Defense); the defendants did 
not receive proper disbursement of the funds (Seventh Defense); 
the Bank breached fiduciary duties (Eighth Defense) and the Bank 
failed to deal in good faith and with fair dealing (Eleventh 
Defense). These defenses were properly raised and the Bank was 
put on fair notice regarding these issues, including the improper 
disbursement of the loans. In fact, it was the disbursement of 
one of these loans, the later 1987 loan, that finally went to 
trial. The Bank cannot claim at this time that it didn't have 
proper notice of these claims. 
A. Troy's Claims Cannot be Barred Because of both the 
Statute of Limitations and the Failure to Establish a Prima Facie 
Case. 
The Bank claims that Troy's claims should be dismissed 
because of (1) the statute of limitations; and (2) because of 
Troy's failure to establish a prima facie case. This argument by 
the Bank brings forth the purpose of this appeal. Troy never had 
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the opportunity to establish its prima facie case or have its 
claims heard on the merits by the trial court because of the 
trial court's initial ruling barring Troy's claims based on the 
statute of limitations. 
At the summary judgment hearing the court first asked 
counsel to address the statute of limitations issue anticipating 
that the court's ruling may limit any further discussion on the 
other issues of the case. The court was correct in its 
assumption. After ruling on the statute of limitations issue, 
which barred Troy's claims and defenses, Troy was never given the 
opportunity to proceed on its claims and defenses. The defenses 
should not have been dismissed based on the statute of 
limitations. Troy should have been given the opportunity to 
present the facts on its claims and defenses. 
B. The Statute of Limitations do not apply to Defenses 
Raised to the Principal Action. 
As previously cited in Troy's Opening Brief, the statute of 
limitations do not apply to defenses raised by a party. The Bank 
has conceded this, but then has attempted to distinguish this 
case from the general rule. However, this rule is applicable to 
the facts in this case. A recent case squarely on point is 
Seattle First National Bank v. Siebol, 824 P.2d 1252, review 
denied, 833 P.2d 386 (Wash.App. 1992)(Exhibit "J" to Opening 
Brief). The Bank attempts to distinguish this case by claiming 
that Troy failed to raise its claims as a defense. This however, 
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as set forth above, is simply not the case. Improper release and 
disbursement of loan proceeds were raised by Troy as claims and 
defenses. 
Next, the Bank tries to distinguish Siebol by claiming that 
the trial court in Siebol found substantial evidence to support 
an offset based on the principles of promissory estoppel. This, 
however, should not be a distinguishing factor, as set forth 
above, the trial court in this case, after its preliminary ruling 
on the statute of limitations issue, precluded Troy from 
proceeding to establish its prima facie case for promissory 
estoppel (Troy's Third Claim was Promissory Estoppel) or any of 
its other claims or defenses. 
The Bank's continuing claim that there was no evidence 
presented to the trial court on Troy's claims or defenses is a 
misnomer and should not be determinative. Troy was precluded 
from doing so by the trial court after its initial ruling on the 
statute of limitations issue; therefore, this evidence was never 
heard or presented to the trial court, mandating that this appeal 
be filed. The Bank should not be able to bootstrap this argument 
and have the appeal denied because of Troy's failure to present 
evidence to support its case at trial, when it was precluded from 
doing so by the trial court's own ruling which is being appealed. 
The Siebol case is not distinguishable from this case. The trial 
court should have allowed the defenses to remain. 
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Although Siebol is a Washington State case, Troy has cited 
Utah cases, Jacobsen v. Bunker. 699 P.2d 1208 (Utah 1985) 
(Exhibit "K" to Appellant's Brief), with holdings consistent with 
Siebol. The Utah Supreme Court in Jacobsen held that even though 
the defendants' counterclaim was barred by the statute of 
limitations, defendants were still entitled to a defense up to 
the amount of the note and the defenses were not dismissed based 
on the saute of limitations. Troy should at least be entitled to 
its counterclaims and defenses up to the amount being sought 
against it in the suit. 
Troy's alleged claims relate to the period of time during 
the Bank's relationship with the defendants. This commenced in 
1985 and continued through to the time the law suit was filed. 
Troy's claims are certainly coexisting and overlapping in time 
with the Bank's claims. The statement that there was no default 
under the loan until February of 1990 is not totally accurate. 
There were problems with the loan before this time and it has 
been admitted by all parties that the subsequent loans were made 
to try to remedy the problems created by the Bank's problems in 
funding the initial loan. 
The Bank has failed to distinguish Jacobsen and has failed 
to cite any Utah case law as to why Jacobsen should not be 
followed in this case. This court should follow the Utah Supreme 
Court's holding in Jacobsen and remand the case back to the trial 
court with Troy's defenses and claims intact. 
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C. Troy was Never Given the Opportunity to Establish its 
Prima Facie Case on its Defenses due to the Trial Court's Initial 
Ruling barring the Defenses based on the Statute of Limitations. 
As stated above, the Bank's continuing claim that there was 
no evidence presented to the trial court on Troy's claims or 
defenses is a misnomer and should not be considered in this case. 
Troy was precluded from doing so by the trial court after its 
initial ruling on the statute of limitations issue. Therefore, 
Troy never received the opportunity to have this evidence heard 
mandating that this appeal be filed. The Bank should not be able 
to bootstrap this argument and have the appeal denied because of 
Troy's failure to present evidence to support its case at trial, 
when it was precluded from doing so by the trial court's own 
ruling which Troy is appealing. 
D. The Trial Court's Interpretation and Application of the 
Second Sentence of Section 78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated, is too 
Broad and in Error. 
The Bank without citing any authority in support of its 
position claims that 78-12-44, U.C.A. creates a complete bar to a 
party raising a defense to any action when it would be barred by 
any statute. This interpretation too broad and is not consistent 
with established Utah case law, previously cited, the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure; the general rule that the statute of 
limitations do not bar defenses; and also the general rules of 
construction and interpretation of statutes. 
In Jacobsen the Utah Supreme Court could have easily dealt 
with the issue by holding that the defenses were barred pursuant 
9 
to Section 78-12-44 U.C.A., rather than doing so, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the defenses were available although they 
would have been barred by the statute of limitations. If the 
trial court's interpretation of 78-12-44 U.C.A. is left to stand 
it will be in direct conflict with the Utah Supreme Court's 
ruling in Jacobsen, 
The Bank's attempt to distinguish Jacobsen by claiming that 
the Court relied on Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
is not enough to reconcile the trial court's ruling in this case 
with the Supreme Court's holding in Jacobsen. The Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are not statutory law, therefore, given the trial 
court's broad interpretation of the second sentence of 78-12-44 
U.C.A. in this case, the defenses allowed under Rule 13, must 
also be barred. 
Furthermore, Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which allows claims after the limitation period based on the Utah 
Supreme Court's ruling, would be in direct violation of 78-12-44 
U.C.A., according to the trial court's interpretation and 
application of 78-12-44 U.C.A. in this case. 
The reasonable interpretation of the second sentence of 78-
12-44 U.C.A, in light of the above, is that it is intended for 
cases dealing with the effect of acknowledgment or part payment 
on the tolling of the statute of limitations, as addressed in the 
heading and first sentence of the statute. The second sentence 
should not be pulled out of context and applied to all possible 
10 
situations. This would totally circumvent the general rule 
regarding defenses, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and would 
be in direct contradiction with the Utah Supreme Court's rulings 
on the issue. 
The trial court erred in isolating and then applying the 
second sentence of Section 78-12-44 U.C.A. to this case. This 
sentence has never been given such a wide interpretation as to 
replace or supersede the general rule or principle that the 
statutes of limitation do not apply to defenses. And the Bank 
has failed to cite any case law in Utah or else where in support 
of this position. 
The fact that defenses are not subject to the statutes of 
limitation continues to be the general rule, and continues to be 
the general rule in the State of Utah. Utah courts have so held 
since 78-12-44 U.C.A was enacted in 1951. See Jacobsen v. 
Bunker. supra. and other cases following this general rule which 
have been cited in Troy's opening Brief. 
II. TROY'S COUNTERCLAIMS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON 
THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Troy's Counterclaims were dismissed based on the four-year 
limitation period. These claims should not have been dismissed 
based upon the four-year statute of limitations. 
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A. There is a Sufficient Writing for the Six Year Provision 
of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to Apply. 
There is no question but that the loan documents, which the 
Bank has sued to enforce are in writing. However, the Bank 
claims that there is not an exact written term regarding the 
Bank's promise to have the funds available immediately upon SBA 
approval. (June 24, 1992 transcript pages 22-23). However, it 
is not necessary that the exact term sought to be enforced be in 
writing for the six-year provision of Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. to 
apply; it can even be oral, as long as it relates to or grows out 
of a written instrument. Evans v. Pickett Bros. Farms, 499 P.2d 
273 (Utah 1972). 
In Pickett Bros. Farms the actual obligation arose out of an 
oral promise made to pay the plaintiff while the parties were 
negotiating a written contract. The Court found that the 
obligation to pay and breach thereof arose out of the written 
contract the parties later agreed to and the Court imposed the 
six-year limitation period. Id. at 275. In this case, there is a 
writing concerning the initial $325,000 loan. The Bank agreed to 
disburse the funds for the initial loan upon SBA approval. The 
Bank however failed to do so and delayed in disbursing the funds 
as provided for in the written loan instruments. This failure or 
breach relates to the written loan documents and thus falls 
within the six-year statute of limitations provision. Even if 
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the Bank disputes these facts, all facts are to be construed in 
favor of the opposing party on summary judgment. 
B. Even if the Four-Year Limitation Period is Applied the 
Allegations Contained in the Counterclaim Cover Actions Occurring 
Within the Four-Year Period. 
Even if the four-year limitation period is applied Troy's 
Counterclaims are based upon numerous transactions and its on-
going relationship with the Bank which commenced in 1985 and 
continued through November 1988 and thereafter. (See Statement 
of Facts Nos. 15-18) Therefore, Troy's Counterclaim dealing with 
the November 1988 loan should not have been dismissed by the 
court on summary judgment based on the four-year limitation 
period. 
C. The Trial Court Never Heard or Ruled on the Merits of 
the Counterclaim and the Defendants' were Never Given the 
Opportunity to make their Prima Facie Case. 
Troy adamantly denies the Bank's statement that the trial 
court heard other evidence and argument on issues as to Troy's 
Counterclaims, which were previously dismissed based on the 
statute of limitations. The trial court after dismissing the 
Counterclaim based on the statute of limitations did not proceed 
and hear the other grounds for dismissal. The court had no 
reason to do so after its initial ruling on the statute of 
limitations issue. This is why the hearing was held in two 
stages. The statute of limitations issue was addressed first so 
that the court would not have to hear further evidence or 
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argument on the Counterclaims dismissed based on the statute of 
limitations argument. 
In Global Recreation v. Cedar Hills Development, 614 P.2d 
155 (Utah 1980) cited by the Bank, the grounds relied on to 
sustain the courts decision had been argued, briefed, and 
presented to the court at trial for adjudication. This is 
certainly not what happened in this case. Furthermore in the 
case Viehwev v. Thompson, 647 P.2d 311, (Idaho 1983) also cited 
by the Bank, the appellate court found that the dismissal based 
on the statute of limitation was harmless error because of the 
trial court's finding on comparative negligence. There was no 
finding of fact on Troy's Counterclaims in this case, which were 
dismissed based upon the statute of limitations. 
The Bank on pages 15 through 31 of its Brief goes on with 
argument concerning other grounds for dismissal of Troy's 
Counterclaims which were never heard or ruled on by the trial 
court at the summary judgment hearing. Troy contends, as stated 
above, that there was no ruling or findings of fact by the trial 
court on these issues to properly raise these issues before this 
court on appeal. If the court does wish to consider these issues 
Troy refers the court to its memoranda filed in relation to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Attached hereto as Exhibit "A"). 
The only Counterclaims the court did not dismiss based on 
the statute of limitations are Count Five for Control and Self 
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Dealing and Count Six for Breaches of Good Faith and Fair 
Dealing. These will be addressed below. 
III. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT RELATING 
TO THE LIMITED CLAIMS NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, BUT DISMISSED 
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
There are genuine issues of material fact relating to the 
limited claims not barred by the statute of limitations, but 
dismissed on summary judgment. These limited claims are Count 
Five for Control and Self-dealing and Count Six for Breaches of 
Duties of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
As set forth above, the Bank's relationship and action with 
Troy was continuing and continued well into November of 1988. 
The delay in funding the initial loan for $325,000 was only the 
start of a continuing relationship, which evolved into a deeper 
relationship, involving other loans and actions by the Bank, 
giving rise to allegations of control and self-dealing and 
breaches of good faith and fair dealing. This was all subsequent 
to September of 1985 and continued through November of 1988. 
The Bank has admitted that the $60,000 loan was to resolve 
the funding problem with the $325,000 loan and the $60,000 loan 
was not made until February 10, 1987. Again in November of 1988, 
the Bank made loans to the defendants and materially changed the 
terms of the original loan documents. (Statement of Facts Nos. 
15, 16 & 17) This action occurred in November of 1988 and 
certainly presents an issue of fact on the November 1988 loan in 
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relation to Troy's Fifth and Sixth Claims for Control and Self-
dealing and Breaches of Good-faith and Fair dealing. These 
counts should not have been dismissed by the court on summary 
judgment. 
There is also an issue of fact as to whether a special or 
fiduciary relationship was developed between the Bank and the 
Troy Defendants. Although a lender is generally not in a 
fiduciary position, facts and circumstances often arise which 
create a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship does 
arise when the banks become financial advisors. This is 
particularly true when there has been a relationship established 
for a period of time, justifying the customer's reliance on the 
Bank to act in his best interest. Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 
64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937); Deist v. Wachholz, 678 P.2d 188 
(Mont. 1984). In the instant case, Troy relied on the Bank to 
act in its best interest. The Bank failed to properly disburse 
funds to Troy and was acting as a financial advisor to Troy on 
how to generate cash and obtain money from the SBA to alleviate 
the problems created by the Bank. The Bank is also a fiduciary 
to Troy pursuant to statute, as the trustee on the deeds of trust 
securing the loans in this case. Section 22-1-1 et. seq. U.C.A. 
1953 as amended. 
The Bank also exercised control over the Troy which is 
sufficient to raise issues of fact as to whether a fiduciary 
relationship existed and is so whether it was breached. A.G. 
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Jensen Farms Co. v. Carqill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). 
The Bank's control and dominance over Troy was so substantial 
that Troy's operations and affairs in Utah rested totally in the 
control of the Bank. Troy is an out-of-state family run business 
and relied heavily on the Bank for its financial advise. This 
was especially true since Troy ran into its problems as a result 
of the Bank's failure to timely fund the initial loan. Troy 
relied totally on the Bank's creative financing ideas to remedy 
the situation. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Bank paid itself 
first from the proceeds of the November 1988 loan, contrary to 
what was represented to the SBA and without full disclosure to 
Troy. This alone raises issues of fact concerning the Bank's 
self dealing. Rosenberqer v. Herbert, 232 A.2d 634 (Pa. 1967). 
A fiduciary owes a duty of "utmost good faith and scrupulous 
honesty" and has "a corresponding obligation to made good faith 
disclosures of all facts relevant to the transaction." Kirbv v. 
Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App. 1985); Meyers v. Moody, 693 
F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982). The Bank breached its duty to 
disclose all relevant information to Troy in this case and Troy's 
claim for control and self dealing should not have been dismissed 
on summary judgment. 
Moreover, factual issues are present in this case invoking 
the imposition of liability for the breach of a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing. Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal.Rptr. 
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123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard 
Oil Co,. 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984). For one, the parties were 
in inherently unequal bargaining positions. This is particularly 
true after the Bank failed to disburse the initial funds, which 
put Troy in financial straits from the beginning and subject to 
the Bank's control. Second, Troy was especially vulnerable 
because of the harm it would suffer if the Bank refused to remedy 
the situation as a result it had to place a great deal of trust 
in the Bank to perform; and finally, the Bank was aware of Troy's 
vulnerability. 
All of these factual issues are relevant concerning the 
Bank's fiduciary duty to Troy and the breach of the Bank's duty 
of good faith and fair dealing occurring on the November 1988 
loan; therefore, the Bank's motion for summary judgment on these 
claims should not have been granted. Wallis v. Superior Court, 
207 Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.. Inc. 
v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984). 
IV. THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS IN ERROR 
AND SHOULD BE REVERSED SO THAT THE CASE 
CAN BE HEARD ON THE MERITS WITH THE 
DEFENDANTS' CLAIMS AND DEFENSES INTACT. 
The trial court's ruling is in error. The trial court 
dismissed Troy's Counterclaims based on the four-year limitation 
period when the six-year period should have been applied. The 
dismissal of Troy's Counterclaims is certainly material to Troy's 
case and the dismissal unjustly prejudiced Troy by precluded Troy 
18 
from proceeding any further with its defenses and claims against 
the Bank. This constitutes a material error. 
Furthermore, the trial court erred in dismissing Troy's 
defenses based on the statute of limitations. The law is clear 
in Utah and other jurisdictions that the statute of limitations 
do not bar a party from raising a defense to an action. 
Finally, there are genuine issues of material fact present 
relating to the claims not dismissed based on the statute of 
limitation, therefore, these claims should not have been 
dismissed on summary judgment. 
The ruling of the trial court on these issues was in error 
and should be reversed so the matter can be heard with Troy's 
Counterclaims and defenses intact. 
CONCLUSION 
The defenses raised by Troy are not subject to the statutes 
of limitation and should not have been dismissed on summary 
judgment. Troy's Counterclaim should not have been dismissed on 
summary judgment. The trial court's granting of summary judgment 
on these issues should be reversed. 
The Final Judgment, Decree and Order of Foreclosure entered 
by the District Court should be set aside. The case should be 
remanded back to the District Court for a trial on the merits 
with Troy's defenses and Counterclaim intact. 
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DATED this ftj day of March, 1994. 
BROWN & BROWN, P.C. 
•L lO^*44L 
ty. Call, Esq. 
[ttorney for Appellants 
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DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT EXHIBIT "A" 
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•Charles C. Brown (1447) 
Jeffrey B. Brown (0457) 
Budge W. Call (5047) 
BROWN & BROWN, F.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterclaimants 
505 East 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 355-6800 
Telefacsimile: (801) 531-7271 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL 
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL; 
KAREN SUE KEHL and JOHN DOES 
1 through 10, 
Defendants. 
TROY HYGRO SYSTEMS, INC.; 
MICHAEL R. KEHL; GLORIA F. KEHL 
LENORE F. KEHL; KEITH KEHL; 
KAREN SUE KEHL, 
Counterclaimants 
vs. 
STATE BANK OF SOUTHERN UTAH 
a Utah Banking Corporation, 
Counterclaim 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANTS* MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 900901153 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The defendant Troy Hygro Systems, Inc.. and the remaining 
above-named defendants (hereafter referred to collectively as 
"Troy- or -defendants") respectfully submit the following 
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff, state Bank of Southern Utah (hereinafter "State 
BankM or simply -Bank") filed a Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, seeking the dismissal of the defendants' Counterclaim/ 
which consists of seven claims for relief, as follows: (1) Breach 
of Agreement to Fund, (2) Wilful Breach of Contract and Economic 
Duress, (3) Promissory Estoppel, (4) Negligent Structuring and 
Disbursal, (5) Control and Self Dealing, (6) Breaches of Good 
Faith and Fair Dealing, and (7) Accounting, Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief. 
To prevail on its Motion the plaintiff has the burden to 
show that there are no genuine issues of material fact, as to 
each claim, when viewing the evidence in light most favorable to 
the defendants. Beehive Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Co., 780 
P.2d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1982). As the court is aware, summary judgment is not to 
be used to determine what the facts are, but only whether there 
are any material issues of fact in dispute. Hill ex. rel« Foael 
v. Grand Cent., Inc.. 477 P.2d 150 (Utah 1970) (the court cannot 
consider weight of testimony or credibility of witnesses on 
summary judgment); Sandbera v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978) 
(the sole inquiry on summary judgment is whether there is a 
material issue of fact to be decided); Spor v. Crested Butte 
Silver Mining. Inc. 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987). 
In this case there are clearly issues of material fact 
relating to the claims asserted in defendants9 Counterclaim, 
precluding summary judgment. Plaintiff concedes that there are 
issues of fact, but contends that these factual issues are 
immaterial. (Plaintiff's Memorandum page 3) However, these 
issues of fact are clearly material to the defendants' 
Counterclaim. 
A material issue of fact is one that affects the outcome of 
the litigation and requires a trial to resolve the parties' 
differing versions of the truth. Daniels v. Powell, 604 F.Supp 
689 (N.D. 111. 1985). In general for tort claims, as those 
asserted in defendants' Counterclaim, factual issues exist and 
are material to the resolution making summary judgment 
inappropriate. Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21 (8th 
Cir. 1979) As set forth herein, there are genuine issues of 
material fact relating to defendants' Counterclaim; therefore, 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS IN DISPUTE: 
1. Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 3. Troy 
did not own the four greenhouses on the property. The whole 
eight acres, including the improvements, four greenhouses, was 
leased from Boyd Christensen. (Markell Depo., pages 34-35) 
2. Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 5. Troy 
never intended to borrow money to finance the construction of 
additional greenhouses on the property leased from Christensen. 
In fact Troy did not want any additional property, but wanted to 
znaxe use or the idle property they already owned. (Kehl Depo., 
page 115, 157-166/ 195; Markell Depo., page 33-35, 38). Phe need 
to finance the construction for both the greenhouses and property 
purchase was a result of the actions of Christensen and the Bank. 
(Kehl Depo., pages 193-194; 155-157, 164-166, 195; Markell Depo., 
pages 33-38). When Boyd requested that Troy purchase the 
property Troy did not think there was any possible way and that 
the deal was dead. (Markell Depo., pages 40-44) It was the Bank 
that consulted with and advised Troy to make the deal and 
insisted that Troy could borrow the $325,000 to purchase the 
Christensen property and make it work. (Kehl Depo. pages 191-
194, Markell Depo. 33-38) 
3. Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 6. See 
Troy's response in the preceding paragraph. The loan by Troy was 
to be for $170,000. Furthermore, there was no change in plans by 
Troy as Troy never intended or planned to borrow $325,000. It 
was the Bank not Troy that changed the loan to $325,000. 
(Markell Depo., pages 33-38) Furthermore, Troy objects and 
disputes the Bank's conclusory statement that the Bank did 
everything "in a routine and customary manner." As set forth 
herein, the Bank did everything but handle this situation in a 
routine and customary fashion. 
4. In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 7, 
the pro-formas for cost and income projection and construction 
were based upon the loan of $170,000. (Markell Depo., pages 197-
198; M.Kehl Depo., pages 33-38; 156-166). Furthermore the pro-
formas indicated to the Bank the time restrictions placed on the 
project. (Markell Depo., page 123). 
5. In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 8, 
each party knew that the loan was to be approved by the Small 
Business Administration of the United States Government ("SBA") 
and that the Bank would loan the funds immediately upon SBA 
approval so that the necessary construction could commence on the 
project as scheduled. (Markell Depo., pages 65-76) 
6. Troy adamantly disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact 
No. 9. The Bank had committed to loan the funds to Troy upon SBA 
approval and the Bank knew this. (M.Kehl Depo.# page 202) This 
is evidenced by Lee Fife's Affidavit wherein he states that he 
was hopeful the Bank would have money to loan when the SBA 
approved the loan and that as soon as SBA approval was given the 
Bank moved as quickly as it could to remedy the situation. (Fife 
Affidavit, paragraphs 14 & 15) The Bank knew it was committed to 
loan the money upon SBA approval. Furthermore, the Bank 
continually represented to Troy that the funds would be available 
upon SBA approval and at no time did the Bank tell or inform Troy 
that the funds may not be available (Markell Depo., pages 
34,39,49,52,53,59,61,66,67 and 69) although according to Fife's 
own Affidavit the Bank knew there was a problem with the funds 
being available approximately 30 days prior to SBA approval. 
(Affidavit Lee Fife, para. 13). 
7. In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 
10, Troy continually informed State Bank of the need to obtain 
the funds immediately upon the approval of the SBA so that 
construction could commence. Troy continued to inform the Bank 
that any delay in the funding would make miserable working 
conditions and effect the planting of the crop and thus 
jeopardize the chances of the project overall. (Markell Depo., 
pages 65-76) 
8. In relation to plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 11, 
verbal approval was received from the SBA in the first part of 
August more than 30 days prior to the written approval. (Markell 
Depo., pages 67-76) The Bank, however, continued to make Troy 
wait unreasonably before disbursing the funds. (Markell Depo., 
pages 65-80) 
9. Troy does not dispute plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 
12, to the extent that the Bank did not loan the funds upon SBA 
approval. Troy further asserts that the Bank by this time had 
committed to loan the money to Troy upon SBA approval and was 
aware of Troy's reliance on the funds. (See paragraphs 6 & 7 
above) 
10. Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 13. 
Lee Fife in his own Affidavit states that the Bank's lending 
ability became tight approximately 30 days prior to SBA approval 
and the Bank did not know if it could loan the funds. (Fife 
Affidavit, paragraph 13). The Bank being aware of this, however, 
failed tell Troy about the problem or that the funds may not be 
available. (Markell Depo., page 81). In fact, the Bank assured 
Troy that the funds would be available upon SBA approval. Troy, 
therefore, unaware of the Bank's problems, reasonably relied on 
the commitment of the Bank to have the funds to loan upon SBA 
approval. These issues regarding the Bank's failure to disclose 
relevant information to Troy and Troy's reliance on the Bank's 
commitment to have the loans available upon SBA approval, alone 
raise material issues of fact precluding summary judgment. 
11. In clarification to plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 
14, the Bank by its own admission tried to remedy the situation 
because it realized that it had a commitment to Troy to have the 
funds available and loan the same to Troy upon SBA approval. 
Troy disputes the Bank's assertion that the situation was totally 
remedied or that the Bank moved quickly. The Bank handed the 
loan package, pre-approved, to Markell and told him to peddle it 
in the street to the other banks to try and get the funds. 
(Markell Depo., page 78) 
12. Troy disputes plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 15. 
Under the facts and circumstances, Troy had been forced into by 
the Bank and as a direct result of the Bank's wrongful actions 
Troy had no choice but to complete the loan. Troy was not aware 
of the Bank's problem with having available funds until after the 
SBA approval was obtained and therefore, Troy did not have a 
reasonable opportunity to pursue other options. Troy also had 
incurred a great deal of expense relying on the necessary and 
timely funding by the Bank and had no choice but to complete the 
loan or suffer substantial losses and lose the project. (Kehl 
Depo., pages 207-208) Troy was placed in fear of not only losing 
its deal with the Bank, but of sustaining substantial losses and 
having to close its operations in Utah. Troy was thus compelled 
to complete the loan and sign the loan documents against its 
ordinary free will. In addition the Bank, being responsible for 
the situation, continually consulted with Troy and would approach 
Troy with new creative ideas to try and remedy the problems, 
creating a special relationship with Troy. The Bank was also in 
a fiduciary relationship with Troy, as the Trustee on the Trust 
Deeds issued to secure both the $325,000 and $60,000 loans. Troy 
had no reasonable choice but to put its trust in the Bank to 
remedy the situation. Again, at a minimum, material issues of 
fact are presented precluding summary judgment. 
13. Troy objects and disputes plaintiff's Statements of 
Fact Nos. 16 & 17. Troy objects to these statements because 
plaintiff has failed to cite to the record. Troy disputes these 
statements as the record clearly indicates that Troy experienced 
cash flow problems from the start because of the late 
disbursement from the Bank. (M.Kehl Depo., pages 246-291; 268-
269) It was the result of this delay that Troy needed to recover 
the operating capital it had used to make up for the delay. 
Again the Bank tried to remedy the situation by loaning an 
additional $60,000. The Bank did this because it realized that 
it was responsible for the problem. (Affidavit of Lee Fife, 
paragraph 13) However, this reason could not be given to the SBA 
so in filling out the $60,000 loan application Fife cited 
different reasons for the money. (Markell Depo., page 105) 
This is also consistent with plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 19 
to the extent that the $60,000 loan was to resolve the problem 
caused by the Bank's delay in the original funding. 
14. Troy disputes plaintifffs Statement of Pact No. 19, to 
the extent it infers that the $60,000 loan resolved the damages 
caused by the delay. The $60,000 loan did not remedy the 
situation and Troy continually told the Bank that the matter was 
not resolved. (M.Kehl Depo., pages 268-269, 380-381, 246-291). 
Furthermore, the $60,000 loan was not properly disbursed. (See 
Troy's Statement of Fact No, 16 below) 
15. To clarify plaintiff's Statement of Fact No. 21, Troy 
did experience some set backs in growing the tomatoes; however, 
it was Troy's problems with the Bank and the Bank's continuing 
commitments and then failure to follow through that finally 
caused Troy to shut down its greenhouse operations in Utah. As a 
result of the delays and Troy's problems with the Bank, Troy was 
unable to compete in the tomato market. Again this is a material 
question of fact precluding summary judgment. 
ADDITIONAL FACTS: 
16. The loan by Troy was to be for $170,000 to build 
greenhouses. (M.Kehl Depo., page 159-160, 163) Troy intended 
to continue to lease the land from Christensens. (M.Kehl Depo., 
page 166) Troy didn't want more property but wanted to make use 
of the idle property they already owned. (Kehl Depo., page 115, 
157^166, 195; Markell Depo., page 33-35, 38) Troy wanted to 
ataurt construction on the greenhouses by the end of July. 
(Mai-kell Depo., pages 57-58) 
17. Then out of the blue, Boyd Christensen requested that 
Troy purchase the land it was leasing for $150,000. (Markell 
Depo., page 41) Troy did not believe that there was any way 
possible for it to borrow the $325,000 necessary to build the 
greenhouses and purchase the property and considered the deal as 
over and dead. (Markell Depo., pages 40-44, 161) It was an 
absolute impossibility• (Markell Depo. page 49) 
18 The Bank then consulting with Troy in its financial 
decisions, advised to Troy to borrower the full amount and 
insisted that Troy could borrow the $325,000 necessary to 
purchase the Christensen property and construct the greenhouses. 
(Kehl Depo. pages 191-194, Markell Depo. 33-38, 51-53). 
19. Christensen was a customer of the Bank and knew people 
at the Bank. (Markell Depo., page 54) Christensen was under 
pressure from the Bank to sell the property to pay off the Bank. 
(M.Kehl Depo., pages 187-192) The Bank was enthusiastic about 
Troy purchasing the Christensen property and moved quickly once 
the decision to borrow the $325,000 and purchase the Christensen 
property was made. (M.Kehl Depo., page 191) In consulting with 
Troy the Bank was more concerned about its own position with 
Christensen than Troys, otherwise, the Bank would not have 
advised Troy to borrow $325,000 for the same purpose and same 
collateral as the $170,000 loan. (M.Kehl Depo., page 192) 
20. In May of 1985, the Bank committed to loan the money to 
Troy pending SBA approval. (M.Kehl Depo., pages 199 & 202). 
After this time the Bank (Fife) became even more involved in the 
financial planning and consulting of Troy. The involvement of 
Troy became more of obtaining instructions from the Bank. 
(M.Kehl Depo., page 202) 
21. Based upon the commitment from the Bank in May of 1985 
to loan the money, Troy proceeded with appraisals and the other 
steps necessary to complete the loan as instructed by the Bank. 
(M.Kehl Depo., pages 199-202) 
22. Troy continually informed the Bank of the time 
limitations and the need to obtain the funds immediately upon SBA 
approval so that construction could commence. Troy continued to 
inform the Bank that any delay would make miserable working 
conditions and effect the planting of the crop and thus 
jeopardize the chances of the project overall. (Markell Depo., 
pages 65-76) 
23. In response to Troy's expressed concerns the Bank 
continually represented to Troy that the funds would be available 
upon SBA approval and at no time did the Bank tell or inform Troy 
that the funds may not be available. (Markell Depo., pages 
34,39,49,52,53,59,61,66,67 and 69). 
24. The Bank, however, knew there was a problem with the 
funds being available approximately 30 days prior to SBA 
approval. (Affidavit Lee Fife, para. 13). 
25. Even after SBA approval was obtained the Bank, 
continued to make Troy wait before disbursing the funds. (Markell 
Depo., pages 65-80) It was not until later that Troy discovered 
from other sources that the Bank did not have the funds available 
to loan to Troy upon SBA approval. (Markell Depo., page 81; 
Affidavit Lee Fife, paragraph 13) 
26. As a result of the Bank's delay construction was 
delayed as well as the planting of the tomato crop resulting in 
cash flow problems. (Markell Depo., page 93-98; M.Kehl Depo., 
pages 246-291; 268-269) Although the delay may seem minor it 
created a wide variety of problems
 r as far as construction, 
planting, marketing and production. (Markell Depo., page 195) 
It was the result of this delay that Troy lost $60,000 and was 
over budget causing the depletion of Troy's operating capital at 
its East Troy, Wisconsin, facility* (M.Kehl Depo., page 267-275, 
297; Markell Depo., page 104, 114) 
27. The Bank tried to remedy the situation by loaning an 
additional $60,000. (M.Kehl Depo., pages 267-274; Markell Depo., 
page 104) The Bank did this because it realized that it was 
responsible for the problem. (Affidavit of Lee Fife, paragraph 
13; M.Kehl Depo., pages 286-287; Markell Depo., page 105). 
28. Troy's problems however, were not resolved with the 
$60,000 loan. For one thing, the $60,000 loan was not properly 
disbursed to Troy. Only $25,836.26 actually went to Troy while 
the rest went back to the Bank. At least $20,000 went directly 
to pay off the Bank. (Markell Depo., page 156). 
29. The Bank in order to remedy the situation after the 
$60,000 loan continued to consult with Troy on the project. 
(M.Kehl Depo., pages 283-292). The Bank participated in Troy's 
financial decisions and exercised inordinate lender control and 
continued with atypical lending practices to try to remedy Troy's 
situation, e.g. the Bank continued to come up with a number of 
creative financing packages, that were anything but routine and 
customary, to generate more cash. (See Statements of Fact 30-32, 
infra) The Bank acted as Troy's principal financial advisor and 
consultant. (M.Kehl Depo., page 300). 
30. In November of 1988, again to help remedy the 
situation, Lee Fife at the Bank consulted with Troy as a partner 
and advisor (M.Kehl Depo., page 350) and put together a loan 
package so that Troy could secure a low interest loan from the 
Five County Association of Governments to purchase a delivery van 
($21,000) and so Keith Kehl could borrow money ($49,000) to lease 
the site. (Markell Depo., page 166-167) As a part of the loan 
package Troy was required to pay $20,000 in equity which went 
directly to pay off the Bank. 
31. There were also problems with this loan. The $20,000 
paid by Troy went directly to pay off the Bank. Troy was not the 
borrower, yet, Troy was listed as the borrower on the majority of 
the loan documents. It was also never intended that Keith and 
Karen Sue Kehl would become liable on the previous SBA loans, 
however, the Bank convinced both Keith and Karen Sue into signing 
personally on the SBA loans. 
32. Other forms of creative financing provided by the Bank 
included unsecured loans to the employees of Troy, who, with the 
Bank's knowledge and approval, would loan the monies to Troy and 
deposit the money in Troy's account at the Bank. Such loans were 
made to Markell and Donald Kehl. (Markell Depo., page 112, 134 
and 137). 
33. The Bank by its actions was allowed to control the 
situation and rather than let regulators know the situation, 
(Markell Depo. page 134-137) the Bank continued to loan money to 
Troy to pay off the Bank, (Markell Depo., page 156) Thereby, 
enhancing the Bank's position to the detriment of Troy* 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There are genuine issues of material facts as set forth 
above, precluding summary judgment on defendants1 counterclaims. 
These factual issues are material to defendants' Counterclaims 
and require a determination of issues by the trier of fact. 
Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate and plaintiff's 
motion should be denied. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
A. There is a Sufficient Writing in Regards to the 
$325,000 Loan, 
First of all, the Bank has now admitted that it did not have 
the $325,000 to loan Troy upon SBA approval. (Affidavit Lee 
Fife, paragraph 15) The facts show that there was a commitment 
by the Bank to loan the funds upon SBA approval. Although the 
Bank can claim there was no such commitment, there is at a 
minimum an issue of fact, making this determination inappropriate 
for summary judgment. However, regardless as to whether there 
was a commitment or not it remains undisputed that the Bank 
failed to loan the $325,000 upon SBA approval. 
Furthermore, there is a sufficient writing for the $325,000 
loan to fall within the six year provision of Section 78-12-23 
U.C.A. (1953 as amended). The terms of the contract are set 
forth in the -loan documents and this is sufficient to constitute 
a writing in terms of Section 78-12-23. It is not necessary that 
the exact term sought to be enforced be in writing, it can even 
be oral, as long as it relates or grows out of a written 
instrument. Evans v. Pickett Bros, Farms, 499 P.2d 273 (Utah 
1972). Furthermore, issues of fact are present as to whether the 
Bank properly funded the money to Troy and if Troy received the 
disbursements. This is an affirmative defense to plaintiff's 
complaint in this case not subject to the statutes of 
limitations. If the Bank can assert that the defendants are 
liable under the loan documents, then the Bank should also liable 
under the documents for any failure or breach on its part. 
Furthermore, the parties entered into a new promise or 
acknowledgment of the debt with the subsequent $60,000 loan in 
November of 1987 and again with a $49,000 loan in November of 
1988. This takes the case out of the statute of limitations. 
Attorney General v, Pomerov, 73 P.2d 1277 (Utah); Cannavina v. 
Poston, 124 P.2d 787 (Wash.) 
B. The defendants' Counterclaims did not accrue on 
September 3, 1985, 
The Bank can only contend that one incident of all the 
claims asserted arose on September 3, 1985, and that is the delay 
in funding the $325,000 loan. However, as set forth above, there 
is a sufficient writing concerning the $325,000 loan. 
Furthermore, as shown by the above facts, the Bank's actions 
with Troy were continuing. The delay in funding the $325,000 was 
only the start of a continuing relationship with the Bank which 
evolved into a deeper relationship which involved breaches of 
contract, economic duress, negligent structuring and 
disbursement, control and self-dealing and breaches of good faith 
and fair dealing, as alleged in the Counterclaim, all subsequent 
to the loan in September of 1985. 
For example, the Bank has admitted that the $60,000 loan was 
to resolve the funding problem with the $325,000 loan and the 
$60,000 loan was not made until February 10, 1987. And again in 
November of 1988, the Bank made loans to the defendants and 
materially changed the terms of the original loan documents. 
These loans involved misrepresentations, economic duress, 
negligent structuring and disbursal, control and self-dealing, as 
well as breaches of duties of good faith and fair dealing, as 
alleged in defendants' Counterclaim. Therefore, defendants' 
Counterclaims did not accrue on September 5, 1985, as the Bank 
would like the court to believe, but went well into the four year 
limitation period, at least as late as November of 1988. 
II. DEFENDANTS' CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT IS SUFFICIENT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW AND PROOF; AND IS CERTAINLY 
SUFFICIENT TO WITHSTAND DISMISSAL ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. The Mutuality of Obligation Requirement has been 
Satisfied in This Case. 
The test of mutuality is to be applied, not as of the time 
the promises are made, but as of the time when one or the other 
is sought to be enforced. Clews v. Jamieson, 182 U.S. 461, 21 
S.Ct. 845, 45 L.Ed. 1183. Both parties in this case have 
performed sufficiently to satisfy the mutuality of obligation 
requirement. The contract in dispute in this case is no longer 
an executory bilateral contract based solely on mutual promises 
as argued by plaintiff in its memorandum. Both parties have 
performed or attempted to perform under the contract and upon 
such performance the contract becomes clothed with valid 
consideration and cannot be void for want of mutuality. Rubin v. 
Dairymen's League Co-op, Ass'n, 284 N.Y. 32, 29 N.E.2d 458, (even 
when the obligation of a unilateral contract is suspended for 
want of mutuality at its inception, upon performance by the 
promisee a consideration arises which relates back to the making 
of the promise and it becomes obligatory)• 
Furthermore, an obligation may be implied from the facts in 
order to show mutuality. P.T. McDermott, Inc. v. Lawyers' Mortq. 
Co., 232 N.Y. 336, 133 N.E. 909. Accordingly, where one party 
has fully performed a contract on his part even though he could 
not originally have been compelled to do so, the other party 
cannot avoid liability for his breach thereof on the grounds of 
want of mutuality. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co. v. Pollock, 73 
P.2d 427 (1937). Therefore, although neither party may not have 
been required to complete the loan at the initial stages both 
parties attempted performance and the Bank cannot now avoid 
liability for breach on the grounds of want of mutuality. 
B. The Contract Cannot Fail for Lack of Mutuality as 
Consideration has been Given. 
First of all "mutuality of obligation" is only a semantical 
exercise surrounding the real determination of a contract, 
namely, consideration. Adalex Laboratories, Inc. v. Krawitz, 270 
P.2d 346 (Okl. 1954); Clausen & Sons, Inc. v. Theo. Hamm Brewing 
Co.. 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1973). Where there is consideration 
for a contract there is no additional requirement of mutuality of 
obligation. Restatement, Contracts 2d Section 79(c). As stated 
above there has clearly been sufficient consideration given for 
the contract in this case, therefore, the contract cannot fail 
for mutuality of obligation. 
The case of Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Bogard, 494 N.E.2d 
965 (Ind.App. 1986), cited by plaintiff, is distinguishable from 
this case on a number of very important points. First, in Bogard 
there was no attempt by the bank to extend Bogard's line of 
credit. The bank simply refused to deal with him. In this case, 
however, the Bank did loan funds to Troy. Surely, if the bank in 
Bogard had renewed Bogard* s line of credit, but did so 
negligently causing him to default on his payments the outcome 
would have been different. Another important difference in 
Bogard is that the bank refused Bogard's offer for additional 
security and so Bogard had an opportunity to attempt to find 
financing elsewhere. In this case, the Bank never refused Troy, 
but to the contrary, encouraged Troy and urged Troy on, telling 
Troy that the money would be available. The Bank never informed 
Troy that the funds may not be available. In fact, the Bank knew 
it was committed to loan the funds and was hopeful it could loan 
the funds on SBA approval. It was only after the SBA approval 
and the Bank didn't have the money that Troy was informed of the 
problem by confronting the Bank after being informed by third 
parties• 
C. The Contract is not too Indefinite to be Enforced. 
Plaintiff contends that the contract is not enforceable 
because the timing of the disbursement is too indefinite. 
(Plaintiffs Memorandum, page 13 & 17). The rejection of a 
contract for indefiniteness is, at best, a last resort• Wedtke 
Realty Corp, v. Karanas, 131 H.E.2d 579 (N.Y.App.Div. 1953) 
The courts favor carrying out the intentions of the parties 
by enforcing contracts and disfavor holding them unenforceable 
because of uncertainty. As such, the defense of uncertainty has 
validity only when the uncertainty or incompleteness of the 
contract prevents a court from knowing what to enforce. Okun v. 
Morton, 203 Cal. Rptr. 220, 1977). In this case, it is clear 
that the funding was to be made available upon SBA approval. 
This is also substantiated by the Bank's own submitted Affidavit 
wherein, Fife states that the Bank was to loan the funds upon SBA 
approval and that Fife hoped that the loans would be available. 
(Lee Fife Affidavit, paragraph 14) 
Furthermore, where there is an absence as to an express 
provision in a contract that term can be implied if warranted 
under the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Engle 
v. First Nat. Bank. 590 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1979). See also 
Restatement, Contracts 2d, Section 204. Based upon the facts and 
circumstances in this case, it can be reasonably inferred that 
the funds were to be disbursed upon SBA approval. The testimony 
of Lee Fife, that the Bank planned to loan the funds and hoped 
the funds would be available upon SBA approval, and that the Bank 
afterwards tried to remedy the problem as quickly as it could, 
shows that the disbursement upon SBA approval was contemplated by 
the parties, and, at a minimum, raises issues of material fact 
precluding summary judgment. Price Enterprises, Inc. v. Griffith 
Oil Co., Inc., 664 P.2d 877 (Kan.App. 1983) (intention of parties 
in entering into a contract is a question of fact)• 
III. DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF ECONOMIC DURESS CANNOT 
BE DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
All the elements necessary for economic duress are present 
in this case: (1) wrongful acts by the Bank (2) which put Troy in 
fear and (3) compelled Troy to do something against its will. 
Healar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). 
Duress exists whenever one, by an unlawful act of another is 
induced to perform some act under circumstances which deprives 
him of the exercise of free will. In re Adoption of Min, 652 
0.2d 974 (Wyo. 1982). 
A. The Bank's acts were Wrongful. 
As set forth in the above facts, the Bank failed to properly 
disburse the funding for the $325,000 loan upon SBA approval as 
committed. This constitutes a breach of a commitment to fund and 
is a wrongful act by the Bank. This alone distinguishes this 
case from the facts of Heglar Ranch were there was no wrongful 
act committed by the bank. Jd. at 1391. 
Furthermore, the Bank knew that it had failed to properly 
disburse the funds as committed and solicited subsequent loans to 
Troy in order to remedy the situation. The Bank, however, also 
failed to properly disburse the subsequent loans. To say that 
there is no allegation that the acts of the Bank were wrongful is 
simply not correct. At a minimum issues of material fact are 
present regarding the Bank's wrongful actions. 
B. Trov was Compelled to Act Against its Will. 
Troy could not simply walk away from this transaction like 
Stillman in Healar Ranch and be only out of the benefit of the 
bargain. Troy had substantial money invested in the operation, 
relying on the Bank's commitment and if Troy walked away the 
whole project would have been lost. Business compulsion is a 
form of economic duress, where one is compelled to act in such a 
manner or suffer a serious business loss. Nord v. Eastside Ass'n 
Ltd.. 664 P.2d 4 (Wash.App. 1983); Barker v. Walter Hoaan 
Enterprises, Inc.. 569 P.2d 1359 (Wash.App. 1979). 
Furthermore, unlike Heglar Ranch, the Bank in this case 
caused the underlying circumstances depriving Troy of its free 
will, making the Bank liable for the economic duress. Matter of 
T.R. . 777 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1986). Moreover, the question of 
whether there is economic duress is a question of fact for the 
jury, not for summary judgment. Royal v. Morris. 669 P.2d 1100 
(N.M.App. 1983). 
IV. DEFENDANTS' CLAIM FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CANNOT 
BE DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
There were promises made to Troy, as set forth above in the 
facts, concerning the funding of the loan and Troy reasonably 
relied on those promise to its detriment. Assuming arguendo that 
there is no binding loan commitment, liability still arises for 
promises made by the bank if the lender reasonably acts to its 
detriment in reliance upon such promises, under the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. Restatement 2d Contracts Section 90(11 
(1981) . See also Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965). 
The case of Security Bank and Trust Company v. Bogard, 494 
N.E.2d 965 (Ind.App. 1986), cited by the Bank, is not on point in 
this case. In Bogard the bank totally refused to deal with 
Bogard and flat out refused to loan him any money, thus, Bogard 
went else where looking for financing • In this case the Bank did 
deal with Troy and in fact encouraged and urged Troy to loan the 
money and continually promised Troy that the funds would be 
available• 
The facts in this case are more in line with Wheeler v, 
White, supra. In Wheeler the court found a claim for promissory 
estoppel, although there was no binding commitment to lend, where 
the lender sustained damages in reliance upon White's promise 
that the loan would be forthcoming for his construction. See 
also Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d. 267 (Wis. 
1965). In this case, the Bank promised the loan would be forth 
coming and Troy reasonably relied on the Bank's promises to its 
detriment. In fact the Bank realized that Troy was relying on 
its promises and was therefore hopeful that the money would be 
available to lend upon SBA approval, although not disclosing this 
concern with Troy. 
V. THE BANK WAS NEGLIGENT. 
A. The Bank owed a Duty to Troy to Process the Loan, etc. 
in a Competent Manner. 
With every contract is a common law duty to perform with 
care, skill, reasonable expenditures and faithfulness, the thing 
agreed to be done, and a negligent failure to observe any of 
these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract. 
Montgomery Ward and Company v. Schanenbech, 206 S.W.2d 508 (Tex. 
1947) • In this case the Bank owed a duty to Troy to see that the 
funds would be available upon SBA approval as committed. 
B. The Bank by its Actions Breached its Duty to Troy. 
It is undisputed in this case that the Bank did not have the 
funds to disburse to Troy upon SBA approval and thus the Bank 
breached its duty to Troy. Also, as set forth above, after the 
$325,000 loan, the Bank continued to make promises to Troy which 
it breached or failed to follow through on. Again at a minimum 
issues of fact are presented here, making summary judgment 
totally inappropriate. Hughes v. American Jawa, Ltd., 529 F.2d 21 
(8th Cir. 1979) 
C. Trov was Damaged as a Direct Result of the Bank's 
Actions. 
The facts also clearly show that Troy was damaged as a 
result of the Bank's actions. The construction was started late, 
the crop was planted late, etc. Even the Bank admits that it 
made an additional loan of $60,000 to try and solve the problem. 
There can be no question but that Troy was damaged as a result of 
the Bank's actions. The question as far as the extent or amount 
of damages is of course a question of fact for the jury, and is 
not for summary judgment. 
VI. THE DEFENDANTS' CLAIM OF CONTROL AND SELF DEALING 
IS SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND SHOULD NOT BE 
DISMISSED ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
A. A Special or Fiduciary Relationship was Developed 
Between the Bank and the Defendants. 
Although a lender is generally not in a fiduciary position, 
facts and circumstances often arise which create a fiduciary 
relationship. A fiduciary relationship does arise when the banks 
become financial advisors. This is particularly true when there 
has been a relationship established for a period of time, 
justifying the customer's reliance on the Bank to act in his best 
interest* Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 
1937); Deist v. Wachholz. 678 P.2d 188 (Mont. 1984). In the 
instant case, Troy relied on the Bank to act in its best 
interest. The Bank had failed to properly disburse funds to Troy 
and the Bank was acting as a financial advisor to Troy on how to 
generate cash and obtain money from the SBA to alleviate the 
problems. 
The Bank is also a fiduciary to Troy pursuant to statute, as 
the trustee on the deeds of trust securing the loans in this 
case. Section 22-1-1 et. seq. Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). The Bank clearly violated its fiduciary trust to Troy 
by its actions as alleged above. The Bank was not acting in 
Troy's best interest in its dealings with Troy, but in the best 
interest of Christensen, who was a customer of the Bank, and/or 
in its own best interest, to see that Christensen's obligations 
to the Bank were paid by loaning additional money to Troy. 
The Bank also exercised control over the defendants, which 
is sufficient to give rise to a fiduciary relationship. A.G. 
Jensen Farms Co. v. Carcrill, Inc., 309 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). 
Although Fife may not have attended Troy's board meetings or 
shareholders' meetings, the Bank's control and dominance over 
Troy was so substantial that Troy's operations and affairs in 
Utah rest totally in control of the Bank. Troy is a family run 
business and although Michael Kehl may have made the decisions he 
relied heavily on the Bank for its financial advise. This is 
especially true when Troy ran into problems as a result of the 
Bank's failure to fund the initial loan. Troy had no choice but 
to lose the operation or rely on the Bank's creative financing 
ideas to remedy the situation. Certainly there is a question of 
fact present as to whether the Bank's actions as an advisor and 
partner rises to a fiduciary duty in this case. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that the Bank paid itself 
first from the proceeds of the loans, contrary to what was 
represented to the SBA and without full disclosure to Troy. It 
is also admitted that the Bank knew of its financial problems and 
that it may not have the money to lend, yet failed to disclose 
this to Troy. This alone raises issues of fact concerning the 
Bank's self dealing and whether an inadvertent or informal 
partnership existed with Troy. Rosenberger v. Herbert, 232 A.2d 
634 (Pa. 1967). A fiduciary owes a duty of "utmost good faith 
and scrupulous honesty" and has "a corresponding obligation to 
made good faith disclosures of all facts relevant to the 
transaction." Kirby v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App. 
1985); Meyers v. Moodv, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982). The 
Bank clearly breached its duty to disclose all relevant 
information to the defendants in this case and Troy's claim for 
control and self dealing cannot be dismissed on summary judgment. 
VII. THE BANK BREACHED ITS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
AND FAIR DEALING WITH THE DEFENDANTS. 
As stated above, a special relationship existed between the 
Bank and Troy, therefore, a duty of good faith and fair dealing 
is imposed on the Bank, including a duty to disclose all relevant 
information. Kirbv v. Cruce, 688 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Tex.App. 
1985); Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982). 
This duty was breached by the Bank. 
Furthermore, additional facts are present in this case 
invoking the imposition of liability for the breach of a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 
Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. 
Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984). For one, the 
parties were in inherently unequal bargaining positions. This is 
particularly true after the Bank failed to disburse the initial 
funds, which put Troy in financial straits from the beginning and 
subject to the Bank's control. Second, Troy was especially 
vulnerable because of the harm it would suffer if the Bank 
refused to remedy the situation and as a result had to place 
great trust in the Bank to perform; and finally, the Bank was 
aware of Troy's vulnerability. All of these factors are relevant 
issues concerning the Bank's fiduciary duty to the defendants and 
the breach of its duty of good faith and fair dealing with the 
defendants, therefore, plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on 
this claim should be denied. Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 
Cal.Rptr. 123, 129 (1984); Seaman's Direct Buying Serv.> Inc. v. 
Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Calif. 1984) 
CONCLUSION 
There are genuine issues of material fact concerning the 
defendants' Counterclaims in this matter. Therefore, plaintiff's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, seeking to dismissal all of 
the counterclaims should be dismissed. 
DATED this "/ day of April, 1992. 
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